Negotiating Bolder International Environmental Treaties: using parallel informal meetings to improve outcomes.
In many parts of the planet the natural environment is showing signs of stress. Awareness of the importance of this brought many nations together at Stockholm in 1972 and again at Rio twenty years later. During these two decades the global community passed more than a dozen international treaties, some of which are more effective than others. These treaties and a range of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations represent emerging new forms of governance that are challenging and transforming established notions of sovereignty [1]. Since the second World War there has been a rapid rise in the number of these institutions (Table 1). Much of the formal interaction of all these organizations is conducted through the process of multilateral negotiations. Table 1. Number of International organizations in three different years during this century (after Zacher 1992[2]
| 1909 | 1951 | 1986 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intergovernmental organizations | 37 | 123 | 337 |
| Non-governmental organizations | 176 | 832 | 4649 |
Most diplomatic negotiation up until the beginning of this century was conducted in secret, usually among a small group (except for some very unusual events such as the Congress of Vienna in 1815), and at a slow pace with no deadlines.A major shift occurred with the treaty of Versailles (1919-1921) and the advent of public, large group negotiations working towards a deadline [3]. The number of conferences and congresses soared from about 100 per year in 1900 to more than 3000 per year in the 1970s. Bilateral treaties have doubled from approximately 6 500 in the post second-world war decade to about 14 000 in 1975[4]. These have dealt with a wide array of security, trade, cultural and environmental issues. Most treaty-making has been conducted under increasing public scrutiny because of the domestic ramifications of such agreements. The emerging system of international negotiation has seen the transformation of negotiation from government-to-government through appointed negotiators into a technically and politically complex exercise involving citizens groups, non-governmental organizations, and technical and scientific specialists.As a part of the evolving nature of sovereignty and governance, this process of change in negotiation is part of the general change in global power patterns (for example, the demise of the Soviet Union), the growth of alliances (for example, the Europe Union) and interests (for example, the G77 countries) and the recognition of environmental problems (for example, ozone depletion). This has given rise to the need for better management of the negotiations and especially a deeper understanding of the multilateral negotiating process. In this paper I explore how and why an informal meeting structure should be formally integrated with larger formal negotiation processes, with special application to environmental agreements. Similar workshop models have been employed in conflict resolution and second-track diplomacy, and in a handful of instances in environmental negotiations. Environmental treaties are different from other types of international instruments. The complex technical nature of the underlying science can prove to be a hindrance, lead to overgeneralizations to achieve consensus, and thus reduce the effectiveness of the agreement. This stems in part from the difficulty that a given country might experience in grasping the full ramifications and implications of a given agreement and, in turn, leads to concerns about the existence of invisible asymmetries within in the treaty that could unfairly burden certain parties. Particular components of the agreement have to be carefully crafted to make them workable and acceptable to all parties in a given negotiation, thus helping to bolster its subsequent authority.
International environmental agreements are generally like other types of multilateral agreements. They contain the various features of bilateral processes such as bargaining, information exchange, decision making rules and the articulation of interests and options. But these all require augmentation for multilateral processes, with a deeper understanding of coalition formation, differentiation of interests and roles, and different meeting structures. The process and constraints of a given negotiation also alter the process internally as a negotiation unfolds and this introduces another set of challenges [5]. Environmental negotiations also have particular characteristics which set them apart from other multilateral treaties. In particular they have types of political and scientific uncertainties with more ambiguous alternatives, and there are sequencing issues and characteristic coalitional behavior. Lang (1991)[6] identifies four characteristics which set environmental negotiations apart from other types of agreements. First, regional or interest groups exist and these can unite delegations geographically or politically. With increasing involvement as the negotiations unfold, they tend to coalesce around particular political positions in the larger conference context. Groups such as this can be useful because they can serve in the basic conference role functions.They can also serve as working groups or sub-groups trying to settle issues by informal consultation, thus serving as negotiating units. An advantage of informal consultation is that, since positions taken are not subject to public scrutiny, parties might change position without losing face. A major disadvantage, however, is that the evolution of a negotiation may be recorded later by a particular participant viewing it through subjective recollection. Nevertheless, according to Lang, the most substantive bargaining has been carried out in this informal context. Second, environmental negotiations have tended to be fairly transparent. Such negotiations have experienced sophisticated lobbying by NGOs: two notable examples are the negotiations of the Montreal accords and the work of Greenpeace in the Basel Convention on movements of hazardous waste. The media generally have served the environmental lobbies well and have served to both educate and to heighten the level of public concern. Third, in a discussion of material factors, Lang suggests that scientific evidence of actual or potential environmental damage has been crucial. This has usually led to examination of the credibility of such evidence during the bargaining process. Groups of scientific experts have substantially assisted conferences drafting legal instruments. Scientific evidence also has competed with considerations of economic feasibility. Finally, according to Lang, environmental treaties have generally not been closed on conclusion and contain re-opening clauses either for new controls or the incorporation of new scientific evidence.Frequently, they have been completed in steps, beginning with a framework followed with increasingly stringent requirements subsequently. I would add to this list a fifth characteristic. Environmental treaties aim to solve a common environmental problem on a regional or global scale and have the appearance of being in essence a problem solving exercise. (Trade or security issues appear more adversarial and are accepted as such in the media.) However, environmental issues often have far reaching implications affecting each country’s domestic economy and politics: this contradiction instills a specific tension into the process which requires some creative management both between domestic constituencies and their conference representatives on the one hand and among parties at the conference on the other [7]. Ignoring this tension can easily result in sub-optimal agreements.
Since the 1972 Stockholm Conference, public concern with environmental degradation and recognition of the link between poverty, population growth and the environment have propelled nations to take some action. Since then, fifteen international environmental treaties have been negotiated, signed and implemented [8]. On balance, these treaties, in spite of the positive aspects of having brought a large group of countries to negotiate and agree, contain a variety of weaknesses. Two of the more successful negotiations include air pollution control (LRTAP) under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in 1983 and the Montreal Agreement and amendments to protect the ozone layer in 1988 [9]. Two relative successes, however, does not offer an optimistic promise of more successful future agreements. Susskind [10] identified four major weaknesses of global environmental negotiation. All were characterized by: 1) no guarantees of fair treatment for all countries and interests through the current voting and representation system; 2) unbalanced scientific and political considerations; 3) minimal linkage among environmental and other policy issues, and 4) ineffective monitoring and enforcement of agreements. Furthermore, these specific weaknesses are connected to three underlying global obstacles which sabotage resolution:escalating North-South tensions; sovereignty vs. multilateral tensions; and, free-rider problems, that is, an absence of incentives to bring parties to the table. Susskind [11] suggests that the substance of both sets of issues could be pragmatically addressed by, first, making changes to the international legal structure to permit legal recognition of non-governmental organizations as legal parties and the establishement of international environmental rights; second, by changing the voting and representation system to reduce the dominance of a few powerful nations; third, by curtailing the misuse of scientific and technical information to advance short-term national interests; fourth, by managing linkage issues with dexterity during treaty-negotiation; and fifth, by dealing more effectively with issues of compliance in the face of sovereignty. This last point is particularly important. Traditionally, nation-states have had a monopoly as actors in negotiations.This has extended, as mentioned in the introduction, to international organizations, transboundary and multinational corporations and industrial units, political parties and movements, and social and religious communities. The actual bargaining, however, is still based on issues of sovereignty:an agreement usually means the partial suspension of each sides’ sovereignty in order to follow points of the agreed-upon contract. This tension between the traditional notion of sovereignty and a contemporary attempt to problem-solve and cooperate is a central underlying reason for stalemates at worst and ineffective treaties at best. Susskinds recommendations are far-reaching and substantively detailed, addressing environmental policy, negotiation process and negotiation structure. My proposal to use informal, problem-solving style meetings as a part of the structure and process of an environmental negotiation is fully consonant with these ideas and recommendations.
Informal meetings are a wholly practical device to formalize a structure that has been sporadically used in a number of different negotiating arenas. As a device, it is intended to be focussed yet adaptable in function. It could be used in prenegotiation phases for the purposes of clarifying initial positions and interests or for exploring and developing options (bundles and linkages).It could be also used directly for negotiation when coalitions have developed and coalitional interests need to be explored, or, when particular issues in the negotiation are proving intractable, informal meetings could provide a format to problem-solve outside of the main course of the negotiation meeting. In searching for a practical and theoretically useful model for informal meetings, I found four types which appear to have some facet of value for environmental negotiations. As would be expected, aspects of each model are also clearly inapplicable.These are: a recent policy dialogue on Trade and Environment; scientific workshops used very sporadically in environmental treaties; problem-solving workshops in ethnic conflict; and, second-track diplomacy. The argument for using conflict resolution models in informal meetings is partially addressed by Zartman [12]. He observes that there are at least two different ways of viewing environmental conflict: “one considers the problem as the adversary and seeks to negotiate with it” (p. 114), and the other recognizes that parties benefit asymmetrically from its solution – “problem solving then is not merely discovery and education, but dealing with motivated, interested conflict inherent in both the problem and its solution.” (p. 114). He sees most envirornmental negotiation as being more like the second case and becoming increasingly so in the future. Most effective agreements, in his opinion, have had an incremental quality. Agreements shift from initial agreements with more tentative language to more assertive and clear goals and what Zartman calls a “fall forward” capacity whereby, with new information, more stringent requirements are agreed to in subsequent Conferences of parties. This incremental stringency pushes parties into more polarized stances.Zartman’s analysis is only partially credible because he asserts in his conclusions that “the environmental process has, in general, been remarkably smooth and productive..” (p. 121). As I outlined above, most international environmental treaties fall short of their intended goals. Even though one could argue that the informal meetings should be considered apart from the formal structure in order for them fulfil their function, I think that Zartman is correct in suggesting that participants would be unlikely to put the adversarial aspects of the negotiation aside. I use scientific/technical workshops as a model because they were essentially value-creating and educational in the context of the negotiations where they were discussed. The policy dialogue serves as model more for a structure for informal meetings, although it also provides some guidance for process. Before describing these models I outline a brief history of negotiation theory to provide some theoretical integration for the use of informal meetings in an existing historical framework.
Informal meetings are an extension of the development of negotiation structures and processes. The theory of integrative bargaining can be attributed to Mary Parker Follett in a cited 1942 paper[13]. Since then a substantial formal body of theory has been developed and explored. Schelling (1960)[14] analysed negotiation theoretically based on “Prisoners Dilemma”: a typical negotiation starts with a minimum of cooperation initially and progresses to a maximum at the conclusion.The gist was to overcome the conflict and time was not critical. Raiffa (1982) title=””>[15] suggested that distributive approaches are necessary for economically “efficient” outcomes – both parties have not strategically misrepresented their value trade-offs and thus not missed “costless” gains. A clear competitive strategy is more likely to win in the long run over meaness and trickery. More recently Axelrod[16] (1984) examined joint problem solving and the use of a “tit-for-tat” strategy. Arbatov (1988) in Kremenyuk [17] analysed the negative aspects of the traditional approach which he divided into three specific components: 1) protracted bargaining; 2) the complexity of domestic negotiation and its influence on higher rank negotiation; and 3) bureaucratization of the talks.Successful negotiations followed a generally hierarchical structure where at the highest level differences in principles were resolved, followed by a legal level, then an expert level and finally, at the lowest, an implementation level. In examining the decoding of the negotiation process, Dupont and Faure (1992)[18] identify four general avenues. Attention has been paid to 1) series of sequences with rules governing sequence of concessions; 2) power processes; 3) persuasive debate; and 4) use of game-theoretic matrices (either improved standard ones i.e. prisoners dilemma, or concepts of critical risk). They discuss global approaches using 1) models such as the three-stage one where the emphasis is on negotiation not being a finite process, and 2) the practitioner theories which balance interpersonal skills and analysis, the latter to aid in uncovering inefficiencies. Dupont and Faure place the origin of practitioner theories and principled negotiation (eg. Fisher19), and management of the tension of value creation and value claiming (eg. Lax & Sebenius 1986[20]) in context. They observe and analyse the process, including types of moves and communication variables. They also discuss referential variables such as face-saving and face-maintenance. They note that the process is influenced by personal traits such as competitiveness and cooperation. In an examination of information (private, public and secret) they suggest that the more negotiators know about each others’ gains and losses, the higher they raise joint gains: this has been experimentally shown. More recently, Zartman[21] points out that until recently the development of negotiation theory has mostly concentrated on two-party processes, in part because of the complexity of the processes involved. In trying to analyse and understand multilateral processes, it has not been possible simply to extrapolate from bilateral processes: a new range of concepts is necessary. Informal meetings are intended to be a value-creation process allowing parties to explore linkages and separate issues, to mutually educate each other and to develop options for later bargaining.
This model provides some specifics about procedure but most strongly serves as beacon to the potential value for parallel informal meetings. The first meeting of the Dialogue[22] sought to bring representatives of two usually adversarial groups together to discuss the general topic of taxes and charges for environmental protection purposes. Participants included GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) officials, ambassadors to GATT/WTO (World Trade Organization), leaders of environmental groups and senior representatives of governmental and non-governmental organizations. All participants attended in their personal capacities and the report[23] contains no attribution of statements or comments. In two days of sessions, a wide assortment of topics were discussed. These included an opening overview session and general discussion of environmental taxes. GATT generally focusses on taxes on products rather than processes, while environmentalists feel that in many cases the most effective point at which environmental taxes should be imposed is on the production process itself.The discussion covered three issues: 1) the effect of environmental taxes on competitiveness; 2) discriminatory or protectionist measures disguised as environmental charges; and 3) feasibility of application. Each of these was then discussed in more detail in subsequent sessions. In Session II the specific problem of carbon taxes addressed the general question of competitiveness, US Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards were discussed as a question of disguised protectionism in Session III. Session IV dealt with recycling and clean-up taxes and Session V with transparency.In Session V attention was focussed on environmental NGO participation in the decision-making process of the WTO, in light of the intention by other international organizations to operate more openly. These meetings were very efficient with a focussed discussion covering a large amount of material in a short time.Participants were ‘intellectually homogenous’ in the sense that they mutually recognized each others’ expertise and that they were all well-prepared. However, these two features are much less likely to be found in an informal meeting during prenegotiations for an environmental treaty.Participants would likely be variably well-prepared, possibly coming from culturally different backgrounds with different styles of interaction and communication. Participants at the Talloires dialogue did not, by the nature of that meeting, have to answer in the end to a home constituency or a government. In a few ways it even resembled a problem-solving workshop for conflict resolution.There were two sides with opposing points of view and a free-flowing discussion was encouraged with unobtrusive facilitation.
Three examples have been mentioned at any length in the literature. In three cases, models were introduced to the discussion that substantially changed the course of the subsequent negotiations.These were the MIT model used in the Law of the Sea discussions, the IMAGE model used in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change meeting[24], and the RAINS model used in the acid rain negotiations in Europe. The MIT model was developed in 1976 to explore the technology and costs of a hypothetical ocean mining operation. It was exhaustively reviewed and then brought to the attention of the Chairman of the Law of the Sea conference, Tommy Koh, by the head of the US delegation.The model proved to be a useful and neutral asset to the discussions on the financial component of the negotiations. It assisted the financial experts to improve the provisions in the informal negotiating text of the conference[25], [26]. On presentation at a workshop during the conference, it was well-received and appeared to improve the tone of communications during subsequent meetings on finance[27]. The RAINS model was developed and used during the negotiations on acid rain in Europe between 1983 – 1991 style=’mso-footnote-id:ftn28′ href=”#_ftn28″ name=”_ftnref28″ title=””>class=MsoFootnoteReference> [28] style=’font-size:12.0pt’>. It was used as a tool to display a full picture of the problem that negotiators were dealing with. It could analyse various scenarios including options for energy use, abatement strategies and mitigation policies. It had the credibility of broad scientific review and input from participants as to the kinds of questions that they wanted to be able to answer.From all descriptions of the introduction of these models, it appears that not only did the model aid participants in grasping very challenging concepts but it also introduced a more problem-focused approach. Clearly, the intention of using these models was to try substantively to develop options in the negotiations. Such a value creating exercise moved the process in a positive direction towards an agreement that provided gains for all parties and a clearer understanding of the problem, both of which helped forge an effective agreement.
Problem solving workshops have been used with mixed success in ethnic conflict resolution in the Middle East[29] and in other conflict areas such as Cyprus and South-East Asia[30], Africa and Latin America<[31]. The theoretical basis for these is strongly social-psychological and much attention is put on the participants to help them develop self-awareness and self-analysis. A supportive environment is created to facilitate this process. There are stringent ground rules about confidentiality and also confidentiality of participation. The reason for the latter is that participants in some conflicts would be contravening treason laws in their own countries if they engaged in contact with adversaries. Psychological case-work elements are used by consultants in this process. This means that the consultant’s role as a third party is supportive (offering sympathetic understanding), non-directive (initiative solely from the client), non-condemnatory (no value judgment reactions from the consultant), self-determinate (the search for solutions is largely in the hands of the client) and analytical(clarifying the clients perception of his/her actual situation in relation to outer reality)[32]. Participants in these workshops are usually drawn from a circle of officials not directly connected to those responsible for ‘public’ managment of the conflict, but rather who may be close to such high profile figures.The workshop permits a dialogue to occur within the conditions listed above. Each side may speak frankly and openly and be sure to be heard by the other participants. New points of view can emerge and exchanges of ideas are possible. The major difference between this situation and environmental negotiation is that the adversity dimension of ethnic conflict is greatly magnified. Participation in problem-solving workshops has usually only occurred because a “hurting stalemate”[33] has been achieved. A second difference is that such a dialogue is usually only constructed around two and very occasionally three adversaries.Most environmental negotiations have many more participants than this. Essentially useful segments from problem-solving workshops are the definition of the role and attitude of the consultants/facilitators and the structure of the dialogue.Some of these elements can also be seen in the fourth type of model, track two diplomacy, that I propose as having some useful elements. This particular case recounts some of the informal contacts between the US and the Soviet Union beginning in 1960.
Hickman and Garrison[34] ascribe the invention of the term “track two” or citizen diplomacy to Joseph Montville, a career diplomat in the US State Department. Track two refers to constructive, unofficial, informal interactions between individual and groups on different sides of ethnic and sectarian conflicts.As an adjunct to official, traditional, nation-to-nation diplomacy, it seeks to reduce psychological barriers between contending parties. At the urging of President Eisenhower, Norman Cousins, then editor of Saturday Review, arranged a meeting between private American and Soviet citizens[35]. The first meeting occurred in October 1960 at Dartmouth College after 18 months of preliminary negotiations. It lasted one week without any substantive breakthroughs.But the development of personal relationships formed a foundation through which the most complex and emotionally charged issues could later be constructively addressed.Full plenary sessions have met approximately once every two years since 1960. Since 1981 smaller working groups or task forces on regional conflicts have met every 6 – 8 months. Plenary meetings involved 30-40 Soviets and Americans conversing around a single table.More often both sides used the occasion to try to “sell” particular viewpoints in speeches full of propaganda. These meetings were almost always superficial. Valuable meetings occurred when there was a well-defined subject of interest to most participants and this led to substantive contributions.In these, each side exchanged views about perceived trends and policies in the other’s country.This encouraged thoughtful, analytic presentations and discussion on subjects such as arms control and the Middle East situation. Plenary sessions were also useful for task forces to report the results of deliberations.The task forces met both in the interim of and during plenary sessions, and these reports helped provide a continuity to the overall project. Task forces consisted of 4-5 participants on each side. These met regularly with a more stable core of participants and greater frequency of interaction – every 6-8 months – which gave a greater sense of continuity.This led to more thorough preparation, more effective follow-up and a longer term perspective.From this, in turn, grew a more frequent elaboration of ideas and insights useful in the policy arena. Preparation on the US side included elaborating the network of informed people involved in the dialogue, developing new ideas and approaches for discussion, ensuring that participants had a clear idea of official policy, and choosing a strategy for discussions.Some task forces found it useful to conduct informal seminars of 15-20 individuals both before and after task force meetings. The preliminary seminar included some part of the above list and in follow-up meetings insights and ideas were shared and discussed. Occasionally, informal papers were prepared but less so as meetings became more frequent, focussed and substantial. Both sides conferred before and after with senior government officials. The primary purpose of this was to reduce the likelihood of incorrect signals but also to ensure that official views were fairly presented.
Informally, there was open recognition of a need to air concerns and grievances.For example the first hour or two of meeting in the arms control task force was devoted to “mutual recriminations” – each side got an opportunity to deliver complaints about the other. If recriminations re-emerged in later parts of discussions, these were stopped by reminders that the time for these had passed earlier.On contentious issues, both sides were able to avoid the almost irresistible urge to engage in polemics and accusations. Real differences of viewpoint were not glossed over: “fawning words of concession and pretended agreement do not win respect or confidence”[36]. Bolling[37] also felt that it was important to state differences with dispassion and to listen attentively to even the most outrageous contrary views. He advocated listening rather than talking and also observed that the most crucial part of a discussion was likely to occur after everybody had spoken once. The value of these conferences was shown on a number of occasions. In October 1962, as the meeting was about to begin, the Cuban missile crisis engulfed the world’s attention. After establishing from their respective governments that the conference should continue, the conferees then played a role in a communication channel via the Vatican. Both groups of participants regarded this occasion as highlighting the absolute necessity of a private forum, even though they recognized that their effect on the overall process was probably quite marginal. In 1969-1970 the Dartmouth Conferences brought together a number of Soviet and US enviromental scientists. These discussions helped prepare for the formal agreements on scientific cooperation signed at the May 1972 Summit meeting. During this same period Soviet-US economic relations were examined and this came to be formalised in the US-Soviet trade agreement in October 1972. The overall conduct of the meetings was not based on universal formulas or guidelines for reaching particular goals. Private diplomacy cannot substitute for official diplomacy – private citizens are in any case forbidden by law to conduct negotiations independently. Stewart suggests that “private diplomacy seems best suited to developing conditions for problem solving”.This then set the stage for intergovernmental movement towards resolution. The goal of this private diplomacy was not to influence directly policies of either country. Rather, the desire was to indirectly shape the images of the possible that policy makers of each country brought to solving problems.The Soviets were concerned about excessive openness and didn’t generally stray too far from official positions and therefore repeated ‘safe views’. In the Soviet Union at that time, formal institutions shaped the influence of internal policy but personal ties were significant and important. Private activities on both sides ranged from establishing contacts with appropriate private persons, to helping develop a clear image of the interests and perceptions of specific issues and even to creating new concepts on questions of mutual interest. Attempting a clear definition of the problem required extended time for formulation and re-articulation[38]. The major contributions of this private dialogue, according to Harold Saunders[39] were:
The Dartmouth Conferences addressed a particular type of tension in a unique context in international relations and did so successfully. Part of its success seems to have been that it evolved to meet the special needs of the situation. The use of a two-tier system for group size and the set of ground rules seem both to have been significant to effectiveness.
These conceptual remarks serve as an introduction to a practical description of parallel informal meetings. Parallel informal meetings are a structured extension of informal contact which have been widely used in all types of negotiations and diplomacy. Problem-solving workshops, the Dartmouth Conferences and the Talloires Dialogue illustrate that a structured meeting can engage intelligent exploration by participants to solve the most contentious types of disagreements. The Dartmouth conferences provide a good basic logistical outline for the structure of such meetings, including the number of participants, the order of discussion and the need to encourage contribution from all participants. Problem-solving workshops provide some guidance as to attitude on the part of facilitators of such meetings. Scientific/technical workshops indicate that education and complex problem-orientation can be successfully accomplished within the framework of a negotiation process. However, none of these models provide a good general foundation for informal meetings in the context of a complex multiparty environmental negotiation.Three of these four models dealt with moderate to strongly adversarial bilateral scenarios. Two of the four were in the context of environmental issues but were more narrowly focussed on issues of interpretation (Talloires) and technical/scientific interpretations. Three out of the four were not directly connected to a formal negotiating process, such as a treaty discussion or a conference of parties. I propose a structure below that draws on the most useful attributes of these four models.
This would be a carefully structured short conference of 25 – 50 participants for the purposeful exploration of controversial issues of substance regarding treaty development, ratification or amendment. It would not last more than three days. The decision to have a parallel informal meeting would rest with the leadership of a new treaty under negotiation or with the secretariat of an existing treaty or agreement as a part of a Conference of Parties. During the process of a formal negotiation, parties concerned with contentious central or corollary issues (these could be defined in the formal process) would be invited to participate in a parallel but structured, confidential ‘conversation’. The intention would be to foster exploration of the agreed upon issue(s) with the help of facilitators. The particular purpose would be to expand issues, discuss alternatives and possibilities, and generate new options for consideration in the formal negotiation process. These would not be transferred as a product of the informal meeting. In fact the entire proceedings would be confidential and any statements would be without attribution. Success in engaging in a meaningful exchange of views in conflict resolution workshops has hinged on total confidentiality, extending in many instances to knowledge of participation in such a workshop. There would preferably be no specific restrictions on participation. The participants would not be limited in number but would be expected to be fully conversant with the topic for exploration. The meetings and the course of the discussion would be confidential, although any agreed-upon statements or report might later be released to the formal proceedings, without attribution as was done, for example, with the report of the Talloires meeting. This type of meeting would be intended to marshall the largest variety of stakeholders, viewpoints and representation possible for the purposes of problem solving. All participants would be required to attend in a personal capacity since this would not be a formal, legally-binding negotiation. All participants would be there by the invitation of the organizers but agreed upon by all parties. Meeting organizers would have distilled a particular controversy down to two or three but no more than five constituent items or questions. The questions or topics would be canvassed both among treaty participants and among other experts by a planning team appointed by the secretariat and narrowed down. Reading material would be selected, prepared and available ahead of time. Respondents would be appointed for the meeting to give a five minute overview of particular positions with respect to a given question. General conversation would follow moderated by two or three experienced mediators/negotiators. Every participant would have, if possible, the opportunity to speak at least once before any one spoke a second time – any individual can cede the chance to speak if they choose.The initial joint session would last approximately 2 1/2 – 3 to three hours (a morning). The following session would be a smaller-group caucus where participants could further discuss specific issues and topics based on the prior joint session.This session could be two hours long (for example, the early part of an afternoon) with one of the mediators present but functioning in a more limited role of time keeper and observer.Again, each participant would have the opportunity to speak once before any one else spoke twice.Each caucus group would have the option of preparing a report to present to the full meeting. This caucus session would be followed by a second joint meeting. Each caucus would have the opportunity to use an inital five minute slot to report to the whole meeting. This session would once again last 2 1/2 – 3 hours and would conclude a day’s meeting.Participants could decide whether or not to come to a joint decision or to decide that a conclusion or particular finality had been reached on a question or topic under discussion.This could include a decision to explore specific and clearly identified details at another meeting. The main intention would be to ensure that a free and frank exchange of views took place.In this way a day of deliberation could be devoted to each of the two or three questions. These meetings should not be confused with and are not intended to replace informal contact. This generally occurs in smaller groups, in corridors and during meals and other social activity during a formal conference and contribute to, and are an accepted part of, multi-party conference and negotiation. A parallel formal meeting would provide both formal and informal occasions to develop personal relationships to explicitly support an integrative negotiation outcome.
A set of ten practical recommendations, known as the Salzburg Initiative, has been developed to overcome the increasing mistrust between nations and to achieve some cooperation in the face of escalating global environmental problems40. Susskind suggests that the major thrust of international environmental treaty bargaining should be around the resolution of the political conflict rather than an exercise in solving a set of scientific and technical problems. Descriptions of some negotiations suggest that these may be more closely linked: for example, of the ten recommendations in the Salzburg Initiative, five would directly benefit from the use of parallel formal meetings. In the first recommendation, building decentralized alliances, clusters of countries with common regional and/or technical interests are encouraged to caucus together ahead of time of a formal treaty negotiation. Parallel informal meetings could provide a format for such regional caucuses.The development of regional coalitions could then be amplified to form larger negotiating units, thus removing the need for this at the formal treaty meeting. Issues of real importance would tend to emerge through this process and these could then be scrutinised in depth during the bargaining process. Parallel informal meetings offer substantial support for the third recommendation, namely adopting new approaches to treaty making. Parties enter the negotiating process with widely different levels of knowledge on the topic, with more positional attitudes about their own interests and with uncertainty about the positions and interests of other parties.Parallel informal meetings offer the possibility of taking clearly thought out positions to a negotiation and of greater flexibility during bargaining. Informal meetings would contribute to the development of regional versions of a treaty by giving the opportunity to consider process as well as substantive issues. Recommendation four seeks to expand the roles for NGO interests. Again, parallel informal meetings are a forum where this could occur.NGO’s have played vital roles in all areas of environmental negotiations and treaty implementation but national sovereignty and international law do not permit them to be parties in signing, ratification or adoption. In attempting to develop a better balance between science and politics, recommendation six suggests that the full range of scientific research be presented without attempts at resolution of the scientific disagreements. Policy makers should not look to scientific groups to provide either policy recommendations or definitive interpretations. Informal meetings would allow groups on opposite sides of a given issue to meet along with members of the scientific community to attempt to disentangle science and policy in a detailed and constructive way. Finally, recommendation seven encourages issue linkage. Creative linkage would provide incentives for countries to view international negotiations quite differently. Developing countries especially would be able to have some of their political and economic concerns more explicitly addressed.Informal meetings would provide a forum where linkage bundles could be created and perhaps bargained on a smaller scale. It might also be possible to develop side agreements in these meetings that would encourage the formation of useful coalitions in a larger formal process.
I have attempted to show that parallel informal meetings could provide a means to explore and enlarge the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) in technically and scientifically complex environmental negotiations. The models I selected suggest that this can be done by focussing attention on particularly controversial issues within a negotiation, with the intention of arriving at a solution by engaging creative thinking of a group. With suitable adaptation, parallel informal meetings might help to refine the process of finding creative and powerful alternatives in other types of negotiations, such as security and trade.